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Abstract
This paper shows how the richer frequency and variety of ﬁscal policy shocks avail-
able in an international sample can be analyzed recognizing the heterogeneity that
exists across diﬀerent countries. The main conclusion of our empirical analysis is that
the question “what is the ﬁscal policy multiplier” is an ill-posed one. There is no
unconditional ﬁscal policy multiplier. The eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on output is diﬀerent
depending on the diﬀerent debt dynamics, the diﬀerent degree of openness and the
diﬀerent ﬁscal reaction functions across diﬀerent countries. There are many ﬁscal mul-
tipliers and an average ﬁscal multiplier is of very little use to describe the eﬀect of
exogenous shifts in ﬁscal policy on output.
Keywords: Fiscal policy, Public debt, Government budget constraint, Global VAR
models.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H60, E62
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Measuring the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy requires collecting a sample of episodes of exogenous
shifts in ﬁscal stance. Such episodes, however, are rather rare at the level of an individual
country. This is why, in order to obtain more precise estimates, it is tempting to pool ﬁscal
shocks from diﬀerent countries and to study their eﬀects in the context of an international
panel. Diﬀerent countries, however, are diﬀerent: in order to estimate ﬁscal multipliers
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1using an international panel one must recognize that countries are heterogeneous. This
paper considers three sources of heterogeneity: two in the transmission of ﬁscal shocks and
one in how ﬁscal shocks themselves are generated. The ﬁrst is speciﬁc to the analysis of
ﬁscal policy: countries are heterogeneous in their ﬁscal reaction functions and therefore in
their debt dynamics. Following a ﬁscal shock diﬀerent countries will aim at stabilizing the
debt-to-GDP ratio at diﬀerent levels and over diﬀerent horizons. The second dimension of
heterogeneity comes from diﬀerent degrees of openness, which aﬀect the way the economy
responds to domestic and international shocks. The third is related to heterogeneity in
the style of ﬁscal policy, that is in the contemporaneous correlation of shifts in taxes and
spending. The aim of this paper is to show how the richer frequency and variety of ﬁscal
policy shocks available in an international sample can be analyzed recognizing that these
sources of heterogeneity exist across diﬀerent countries.
The thin empirical literature which uses cross-country data to measure the eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy has so far overlooked heterogeneity. In Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and IMF
(2010), for instance, ﬁscal multipliers are estimated by pooling all countries together, leav-
ing the country ﬁxed eﬀect as the unique source of heterogeneity in the panel estimation.
The papers by is Ilzetzki (2010) and Ilzetzki and Végh (2011) allow for the response to
ﬁscal shocks to be heterogeneous across diﬀerent groups of countries. However, they do
not allow for interdependence, that is for the propagation of ﬁscal shocks across countries,
nor for heterogeneity in debt levels.1
Recognizing that diﬀerent countries start from diﬀerent debt levels is important be-
cause ﬁscal reactions functions might diﬀer depending on the level of debt and on the speed
at which it accumulates or declines. The importance of keeping track of the debt dynam-
ics in the analysis of ﬁscal policy has been pointed out by Favero and Giavazzi (2007),
Corsetti, Meier and Mueller (2009), Leeper (2010) and Zubairy (2011). These papers show
that studying the eﬀects of shifts in ﬁscal policy without tracking the debt dynamics in-
duced by such shifts might lead to ﬁscal multipliers computed along unsustainable ﬁscal
paths, that is, along a path for the debt that is at odds with the beliefs of those who hold
government bonds. In other words, correctly estimated ﬁscal multipliers should not over-
l o o kt h ef a c tt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sﬁscal actions are subject to an intertemporal budget
constraint. Consider, for example, a positive shift in government spending. Following the
shift, the government may respect its budget constraint by adjusting taxes and spending
so as to keep the ratio of public debt-to-GDP stable, or it may delay the adjustment and in
the meantime let the debt ratio grow. It may even plan to use the inﬂation tax. The choice
of the policy maker will depend on its preferences, its policy targets and the initial debt
level: diﬀerent choices will induce diﬀerent responses of output and other macro variables
to the same ﬁscal shocks. Analyses of ﬁscal policy that do not allow for this source of het-
erogeneity will produce an “aggregate” ﬁscal multiplier that could be totally irrelevant for
the policy makers. As Leeper (2010) correctly argues, “Fiscal policy will shed its alchemy
1A l s o ,i nb o t hp a p e r sﬁscal shocks are identiﬁed within a VAR, an identiﬁcation strategy which runs
against the problem of “non-invertibility” in the presence of ﬁscal foresight, i.e. whenever shifts in ﬁscal
policy are anticipated.
2label when the question “What is the ﬁscal multiplier?” is no longer asked, and detailed
analyses of unsustainable ﬁscal policies are no longer conducted”.
This paper studies ﬁscal multipliers estimating a multi-country Global non-linear
model obtained by augmenting a global VAR (GVAR)2 with each country’s (non lin-
ear) debt-deﬁcit dynamics. The model thus allows for international spillovers and for the
possibility that such spillovers, as mentioned above, work diﬀerently in diﬀerent countries.
We study the transmission mechanism of a particular set of shifts in ﬁscal policy, those
identiﬁed via the “narrative” method in Devries et al. (2011). These are, so far, the only
available set of narrative multi-country shocks. As it is well known, the advantage of the
narrative identiﬁcation method is that it avoids the inversion of the MA representation
of a VAR, needed to identify structural shocks. The narrative identiﬁcation is therefore
robust to the eﬀects of ﬁscal foresight, i.e. to the possibility that shifts in ﬁscal policy
are anticipated (see Hansen and Sargent 1991, Leeper et al 2008, Ramey 2011). Our main
point, however – namely, the importance of allowing for heterogeneity – is independent
of the particular identiﬁcation strategy: it applies identically to the analysis of ﬁscal shocks
identiﬁed imposing enough constraints on a structural VAR.
The analysis of narrative ﬁscal shocks across diﬀerent countries reveals another source
of heterogeneity: tax and spending shocks are typically not independent of one another
and the style of ﬁscal corrections diﬀe r sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .T h i ss i m p l ef a c ti sc o n ﬁrmed by
the set of ﬁscal consolidation shocks identiﬁed in Devries et al. (2011) and reproduced in
Figure 1. In this sample, which spans from 1978 to 2009, the contemporaneous correlation
of shocks to taxes and government spending is in general diﬀerent from zero and the
relative contribution of revenues and expenditures to the overall shift in ﬁscal stance diﬀers
signiﬁcantly across countries. Ramey (2011) recognizes this point when she observes that
the correlation between revenue and spending shocks may change also within a country.
When analyzing the spending shock corresponding to the Korean war she points out that
what makes that shock diﬀerent from WWII shocks is that it was accompanied by a
contemporaneous increase in taxes, something that did not happen during WWII. This
paper explicitly recognizes that shocks to revenues and expenditures are correlated and
allows for such correlation to diﬀer across countries. As we shall see, this additional source
of heterogeneity has important implications for the analysis of the transmission of ﬁscal
policy shocks.
Once we allow for all three sources of heterogeneity – in ﬁscal reaction functions, in
openness and in the style of ﬁscal corrections – and we compute multipliers along paths
that are not inconsistent with a positive value of government bonds, we ﬁnd results that
sharpen our understanding of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. In particular: (i) international
spillovers are important. In the case of Canada, for instance, it makes a big diﬀerence
whether a ﬁscal consolidations happens contemporaneously also in the U.S., or only in
Canada; (ii) the initial level of debt and the stability of the debt ratio seem to determine
whether a shift in ﬁscal policy has "keynesian" or "non-keynesian" eﬀects. In our group of
2See, for example, Pesaran, Schuermann, Weiner (2004) and Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, Smith (2007).
3countries we ﬁnd evidence of non-keynesian eﬀects only in Japan. This is the only country
in our sample where ﬁscal policy does not respond to the level of debt and where the debt
level is non mean-reverting.
Beyond contributing to the empirical literature on the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy our results could be used to discriminate between alternative theoretical models.
For instance, as suggested by Perotti (2011), the ﬁnding of a ﬁscal multiplier smaller or
larger than one can discriminate between a neoclassical and a new-Keynesian model. In
neoclassical models with lump-sum taxation where government spending is pure waste
and produces no externality, a shift in expenditures aﬀects the economy via a pure wealth
eﬀect. As spending rises, the need to satisfy the government intertemporal budget con-
straint makes the present value of taxes rise correspondingly. Note that this channel is
overlooked in models that estimate ﬁscal multipliers omitting the government’s intertem-
poral constraint. Forward-looking agents see their after-tax labour income reduced and
will therefore cut down their consumption of both goods and leisure. Consumption falls
and GDP increases (depending on the elasticity of labor supply) less than the increase in
government spending. The output multiplier is less than 1. In contrast, in a Keynesian
model in response to a rise in government spending consumption increases and the output
multiplier is typically larger than 1, provided that monetary policy does not put too much
weight on output, so that the expansion in output and labor demand are suﬃcient to
generate an increase in the real wage.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe a model that allows for
heterogeneity in ﬁscal multipliers. In Section 3 we provide some evidence on the hetero-
g e n e i t yi nt h es t y l eo fﬁscal corrections. Section 4 shows how we allow for heterogeneity
and how we keep track of debt dynamics in the analysis of ﬁscal multipliers. Section 5
presents our empirical results and discusses what diﬀerence all of this makes. Section 6
examines the robustness of our results to the potential endogeneity of narrative shocks.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Measuring International Fiscal Multipliers
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper does not address the issue of the identiﬁcation
of ﬁscal policy shocks. We instead focus our attention on the transmission mechanism of
ﬁscal shocks using the shocks identiﬁed in Devries et al. (2011), who apply the narrative
method originally proposed by Romer and Romer (2010, hereafter R&R) to identify shifts
in ﬁscal policy in a group of 15 OECD countries.
The typical approach in this literature (e.g. Alesina Ardagna 2010, IMF 2010) is to
study the ﬁscal transmission mechanism via a panel estimation of a cross-country output
equations. The growth rate of real GDP is regressed on a set of current and lagged values of
ﬁscal shocks (tax hikes and expenditure cuts) and lagged GDP growth. In particular, IMF
(2010) estimates, on the sample of ﬁfteen OECD countries 3 the following speciﬁcation:
3Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal,
4∆yi,t = α + A1(L,1)∆yi,t−1 + B(L,2)ε
g
i,t + C(L,2)ετ
i,t + λi + νt + μi,t (1)
The equation includes a full set of country dummies, λi, to account for diﬀerences in
trend growth rates across countries and time dummies, νt, to account for global shocks,
such as shifts in oil prices or the global business cycle. The simulation of the dynamic
eﬀects of the structural shocks generates a single ﬁscal multiplier restricted to be the same
for all countries.
Diﬀerently from this approach, we study the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks in our panel of
countries embedding heterogeneity in the style of ﬁscal corrections, in openness and in the
debt-deﬁcit dynamics in an open-economy model. The model is speciﬁed to contain the
minimal set of macroeconomic variables necessary to pin down the debt-deﬁcit dynamics
endogenously:






i,t + μi,t if i 6= US






i,t + μi,t if i = US
(2)
with
˜ Xi,t ≡ [yi,t,g i,t,τi,t,i i,t,p i,t,s i,t]
Xi,t ≡ [yi,t,g i,t,τi,t,i i,t,p i,t]
Zi,t ≡ [y 
i,t,s  
i,t]
ϕi ≡ [ϕi,1,ϕ i,2,ϕ i,3]
augmented by the following set of identities:
Yi,t = eyi,t+pi,t
gri,t =( Yi,t − Yi,t−1)/Yi,t−1
˜ Bi,t = Yi,tBi,t
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This speciﬁcation requires a few comments:
• the model allows for the correlation between revenue and spending shocks and for
heterogeneity across countries in the conduct of ﬁscal policy. When a ﬁscal adjust-




paired with a shock of size
β
1+β to ετ
i,t,w h e r eβ is computed using the fact that













• the model includes a non linear debt feedback 4. Therefore, the impact of ﬁscal
shocks on output depends on the initial conditions at which such shocks occur 5.
Following a ﬁscal shock, however, debt stabilization is not imposed: the coeﬃcients
on the debt feedback are freely estimated. Note that the coeﬃcients ϕi,1 are allowed
to be heterogeneous across countries, so that our speciﬁcation can accommodate het-
erogeneous debt-deﬁcit dynamics. One restriction we impose on the ϕi,1 coeﬃcients
is that, for every country, debt only appears in the equations for gi,t,τi,t,i i,t and pi,t
6;
• the model allows to compute impulse responses to ﬁscal shocks keeping track of
the debt dynamics. If ε
g
i,t and ετ
i,t are validly identiﬁed shocks, the only additional
assumption required to track the debt dynamics by appending (9) to the VAR, is that
ζi,t is strongly exogenous. ζi,t, captures the statistical discrepancies in the OECD
accounts of the debt-deﬁcit dynamics, and is the only additional shock that needs




i,t are identiﬁed (in Devries et al. 2011) with the narrative method, thus
not requiring the inversion of the Moving Average representation of a VAR. Shocks
identiﬁed from the narrative method are directly included in the VAR and impulse
responses with respect to these shocks can be directly derived from the joint simu-
lation of (2) and the above identities;
• the degree of openness is allowed to diﬀer across countries by letting the coeﬃcients
in ϕi,2 and ϕi,3 to be country-speciﬁc;
• the U.S. is treated as a closed economy. This is not an identifying restriction. We
have imposed that foreign variables have no impact on the U.S. economy to be able
to compare our results with the existing empirical evidence that typically analyzes
the eﬀect on ﬁscal policy in the U. S. within the context of a closed economy speci-
ﬁcation. When the validity of the closed economy restrictions for the U.S. is tested
statistically, the hypothesis that all the relevant coeﬃcients are zero could not be
rejected.
This speciﬁcation allows for all three sources of heterogeneity discussed in the introduc-
tion. In the following sections we shall consider each of them in detail before illustrating
our empirical results.
4Ghosh et al.(2011) also ﬁnd evidence of the importance of dbet feedback and non-linearities in an
international panel of advaced economies
5Impulse responses and their associated conﬁdence intervals are computed by the simulation technique
described in Favero-Giavazzi(2007)
6Zubairy(2011) allows for a debt feedback in a DSGE model, while Killian and Vigfusson(2010), in the
case of oil shocks, and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) also allow for the presence of asymmetries and
non-linearities in VAR models
63 Heterogeneity in the style of ﬁscal corrections
The international shifts in ﬁscal policy identiﬁed in IMF (2010) are tax increases and
spending cuts implemented to reduce the budget deﬁcit and to put the public ﬁnances on
a sustainable path7. Such shocks are identiﬁed for a group of OECD countries using the
record available in oﬃcial documents to identify the size, timing, and principal motiva-
tion for the ﬁscal actions taken by each country.8 This identiﬁcation strategy applies to
a panel of countries the idea originally proposed in R&R who used presidential speeches,
Congressional reports and other public records to identify all major U.S. postwar tax pol-
icy actions. However, the IMF’s shocks diﬀer from R&R’s in two important dimensions.
R&R focus only on revenue shocks and identify two main types of legislated exogenous
tax changes: those driven by long-run motives, such as to foster long-run growth, and
those aiming to deal with an inherited budget deﬁcit. IMF (2010) considers instead both
expenditure and revenue shocks and focuses only on ﬁscal actions motivated by the objec-
tive of reducing the budget deﬁcit. As a matter of fact , in the IMF sample, ﬁscal shocks
only refer to ﬁscal consolidations episodes, there are no instances of deﬁcit-driven ﬁscal
expansions.
This observation raises a question on a potential truncation problem in the in Devries
et al. (2011) shocks’ series. A truncation would arise if there were some omitted deﬁcit-
driven ﬁscal expansion episodes. Although we cannot check for truncation in general, there
are two countries in our sample for which this is possible, the US and the UK. Consider the
case of the United States, for which the Devries et al. (2011) shocks can be compared with
the R&R narrative shocks. The R&R narrative shocks show both positive and negative
observations, however these shocks are constructed by aggregating tax shocks deﬁcit-driven
and tax shocks driven by the long-run growth motive. Deﬁcit-driven ﬁscal expansions
never occur in the R&R sample, where virtually all tax shocks driven by the long-run
motive are expansionary (i.e. negative tax shocks) and all the deﬁcit-driven tax shocks are
contractionary (i.e. positive tax shocks). Therefore the R&R deﬁcit-driven shocks, which
are directly comparable to those identiﬁed by Devries et al. 2011, show no evidence of
truncation. Moreover in the R&R identiﬁcation, deﬁcit-driven tax shocks and long-run
tax shocks are virtually orthogonal (their correlation is −0.08). The same observation -
namely the fact that the series of deﬁcit-driven tax shocks is almost exclusively composed
of tax increases - applies also to the narrative series of deﬁcit-driven shocks identiﬁed by
Cloyne (2011) for the UK. Note, however, that the fact that the multiplier computed using
only deﬁcit-driven ﬁscal shocks is unbiased doesn’t make it directly comparable with the
one computed using R&R’s series. The former is a multiplier with respect to deﬁcit-driven
ﬁscal shock only. The latter, instead, is relative to a generic ﬁscal shock, either long-run or
deﬁcit driven, obtained by imposing the restriction that the output responses to long-run
motivated tax changes and to deﬁcit-driven tax changes are identical.
The original IMF sample includes ﬁfteen OECD countries. The data are annual and
7The dataset is available on the IMF’s website (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24892.0)
8See IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2010, p.96.
7extend from 1978 to 2009. In this sample, there are 173 episodes of ﬁscal consolidation
identiﬁed. In what follows, however, we focus our attention on a representative subsample
of eight countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Sweden and
the United States. This choice is constrained by the availability of the data needed to
track the debt dynamics - such as general government gross debt and interest payments
- which for some of the countries in the original IMF sample are available only for a too
s h o r tt i m es p a n .W el a b e lε
g
i,t the narrative measure of a shock to expenditures (measured
as a percent of GDP) in country i in year t,w h i l eετ
i,t are the identiﬁed shocks to revenues.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
As it is clear from Figure 1, revenue shocks and expenditure shocks are correlated,
and the ﬁscal mix historically used to achieve a correction in the budget is heterogeneous
across countries. In the case of the U.S., for example, the historical data tell us that a
correction of the primary surplus of one per cent of GDP is typically achieved with a
mix of 60% expenditure cuts and 40% revenue increases. In the case of Japan, instead,
the same adjustment is obtained through a mix of 80% in expenditure cuts and 20% in
revenues increases.
The evidence in Figure 1 has two important implications. First, it tells us that, for
basically all the countries considered, the simulation of the eﬀects of a shock to govern-
ment spending, assuming no contemporaneous shift in taxes, would violate the historical
pattern. Such an experiment would describe a situation that does not exist in the data –
because ετ
i,t shocks have never occurred independently of ε
g
i,t shocks, at least in this sample.
This observation casts strong doubts on the usefulness of using the narrative shocks iden-
tiﬁed in IMF (2010) to study the eﬀects of tax-based adjustments separately from those
of expenditure-based adjustments. If the identiﬁed spending and revenue shocks have a
speciﬁc pattern of correlation, that speciﬁc pattern should be preserved when simulating
the eﬀect, for instance, of a tax shock. In other words, it would be diﬃcult to interpret
the eﬀect of a tax shock which is assumed to take place independently of an expenditure
shock since such an occurrence has never been observed in the sample from which the
data are drawn. Second, the evidence described in Figure 1 implies that, when studying
the international evidence of the eﬀects of a ﬁscal correction, one should allow for this
source of heterogeneity in policy, that is for the diﬀerent styles of such corrections across
countries. A shift in the primary surplus equivalent to one per cent of GDP is not achieved
with the same mix in all countries. This restriction, which is implicitly imposed in IMF
(2010), violates the heterogeneity present in the data.
To illustrate the importance of this point we have run an experiment focusing on the
United States only. Consider a regression of output growth on a distributed lag of ﬁscal
shocks estimated to evaluate the impact on output of i) a tax shock of one per cent of
GDP simulated setting expenditure shocks to zero (the experiment run by R&R), and
ii) an adjustment of the primary surplus of one per cent of the GDP obtained using the
8historical mix of shifts in taxes and in expenditure. In practice, we have estimated the
following two models, where i = US and A(L,q) is a lag polynomial of degree q9:
∆yi,t = α + A(L,1)∆yi,t−1 + B(L,2)ετ
i,t + μi,t (3)
∆yi,t = α + A1(L,1)∆yi,t−1 + B(L,2)ε
g
i,t + C(L,2)ετ
i,t + μi,t (4)
The results are reported in Figure 2. The multiplier obtained from (3), reported in
the left-hand panel, is estimated by simulating a shock to ετ
i,t equivalent to 1% of GDP.
On the other hand, the multiplier obtained from (4), reported in the right-hand panel, is
e s t i m a t e db ys i m u l a t i n gas h o c ko f 1
1+ˆ β to ε
g
i,t a n das h o c ko f
ˆ β
1+ˆ β to ετ
i,t.T h ec o e ﬃcient ˆ β
comes from the estimation of ετ
i,t = α+βε
g
i,t+νi,t in the sample. In this second experiment
the overall simulated shift in ﬁscal policy still amounts to 1% o fG D P ,b u ti tn o wr e ﬂects
the ﬁscal policy style observed in the data. As Figure 2 shows, the two multipliers are
quite diﬀerent.
The multiplier obtained using the actual ﬁscal correction style diﬀers from zero only in
the ﬁrst year and is much smaller than that obtained by simulating an isolated tax shock
which is negative and signiﬁcant for three years.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
In the light of this diﬀerence, we favour the idea of computing multipliers based on
the historical correlation between shifts in taxes and in spending, rather than artiﬁcially
setting to zero the correlation between the two. This is nothing new: the simulation of
reduced form models such as a VAR not respecting the historical pattern of correlations
present in the data would run against the Lucas (1976) critique.
4 Heterogeneity in the transmission of ﬁscal shocks
Countries are also heterogeneous in their ﬁscal reaction functions: following a ﬁscal shock,
diﬀerent countries will aim at stabilizing the debt-to GDP ratio at diﬀerent levels and over
diﬀerent horizons. In other words, the eﬀects of a shift in ﬁscal policy will depend on the
country-speciﬁcd e b t - d e ﬁcit dynamics: Figure 3 illustrates that this dynamics is clearly
heterogeneous across the 8 countries in our sample.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Another dimension of heterogeneity is related to the diﬀerent degrees of openness,
because openness determines the size of the multiplier and the extent to which an economy
is aﬀected by international ﬂuctuations. Openness varies a lot across the eight countries




9in our sample. The U.S. is the closest of all. In most empirical investigations on the eﬀect
of ﬁscal policy it is treated as closed economy: we shall not depart from this hypothesis,
assuming that the U.S. economy is unaﬀected by international ﬂuctuations. This, however,
is not true for smaller economies where the eﬀect of a shift in ﬁscal policy, at home or
abroad, will depend on the international economic environment in which such a shift takes
place. For instance, diﬀerences in the response of the economy to a ﬁscal consolidation
might depend on the international environment in which such a consolidation takes place.
It has been argued, for example, that the sharply diﬀerent response of the Irish economy to
the two consolidations carried out during the 1980s - which resulted in a deep recession in
1981-82 and in an economic boom ﬁve years later - were associated with the very diﬀerent
economic conditions prevailing at the time in Ireland’s main trading partner, the U.K.
The empirical model we adopt to measure the eﬀects of a shift in ﬁscal policy addresses
both sources of heterogeneity. It tracks, country by country, the debt-deﬁcit dynamics, and
it allows for diﬀerent degrees of openness. In the remaining paragraphs of this section we
discuss the two issues in turn.
4.1 Tracking the path of the debt
To track the country-speciﬁcd e b td y n a m i c sw em u s tﬁrst recognize that the equation
which determines the evolution over time of the debt-income ratio is highly non-linear.
The fact that this relation is non-linear is the reason why we believe it is important to
track it by means of endogenous variables rather than simply augmenting the VAR with
the government debt series. These endogenous variables are precisely those determining
the path of government debt: the cost of debt service, the nominal growth rate and the
primary deﬁcit. In what follows, we derive the debt dynamics in terms of gross debt and,
by doing that, we slightly depart from previous work such as Bohn (1998), which uses net
government liabilities as his deﬁnition of public debt. We use gross debt for several reasons.
First, statutory debt limits, when they exist, are usually imposed on gross debt. Second,
gross debt is the measure which is more largely available to the public and, for this reason,
it is more likely to be the one entering the information set of economic agents and hence
inﬂuencing their decisions when responding to ﬁscal shocks. Third, there is an inherent
diﬃculty in evaluating government assets, most of which do not have a market price to
be used as a reference. The last reason is technical: in two of the countries in our sample,
Sweden and the United Kingdom, the net debt series turns negative for some years. This is
a problem because whenever the net debt comes close to zero in our simulation it induces
an exploding path for the cost of debt service, hence making the system unstable and the
simulation unfeasible.
In order to track the debt dynamics, we start from the two following identities:
˜ B
g
i,t ≡ ˜ Bn
i,t + ˜ Ai,t
˜ Bn
i,t ≡ ˜ Bn





i,t, ˜ Ai,t, ˜ Di,t and ˜ Ii,t denote, respectively, the nominal levels of gross debt,
10net debt, government assets, primary deﬁc i ta n dn e ti n t e r e s tp a y m e n t s .T h ee r r o rt e r m ,
μi,t, is to be interpreted as a zero-mean vector of statistical discrepancies. From (5), by
adding and subtracting ˜ Ai,t−1 we get
˜ B
g
t ≡ ˜ B
g
i,t−1 + ˜ Di,t + ˜ Ii,t + ∆ ˜ Ai,t + μi,t. (6)
Dividing both sides of (6) by nominal GDP, ˜ Yi,t, (and dropping the tilde to denote ratios






i,t−1 + ˜ Ii,t
˜ Yi,t
+ Di,t + νi,t + μi,t. (7)
νi,t = ∆ ˜ At/˜ Yt denotes the component in the change of gross public debt which is unrelated
to the primary deﬁcit or to interest payments and, instead, reﬂects asset sales or purchases.
Since we have no economic model to determine the evolution of government assets, we shall
assume that νi,t is an exogenous random variable. For notational convenience we deﬁne
ζi,t ≡ νi,t + μi,t and from now on we drop the apex g from B
g
i,t. Setting rt = ˜ It/ ˜ Dt−1 and






+ Di,t + ζi,t (8)
This last equation shows that the dynamics of Bt can be tracked using a parsimonious
number of endogenous variables. Letting yi,t,g i,t,τi,t,i i,t and pi,t be the logs of real out-
put, real government expenditures and revenues, real net interest payments and the price
deﬂator, respectively, we can track the dynamics described in (8) by use of the following
set of identities:
Yi,t = eyi,t+pi,t
gri,t =( Yi,t − Yi,t−1)/Yi,t−1
˜ Bi,t = Yi,tBi,t












Note that the fourth identity imposes a non-negativity constraint on the cost of ﬁnanc-
ing the debt, a feature that will turn out to be very useful when simulating the model over
periods of very low interest rates. Note also that, conditional on Xi,t ≡ [yi,t,g i,t,τi,t,i i,t,p i,t]
and ζi,t, system (9) is closed, which means that we have expressed the dynamics of gross
debt, Bi,t in terms of endogenous variables only.
In order to check how closely our debt-dynamics equation tracks the actual path of
debt-GDP ratios of the eight countries in our sample, we have brought the system (9) to
the data and simulated it forward starting in 1980, by feeding it with the actual values of
Xi,t and ζi,t. Figure 3 reports the debt dynamics produced by this simulation, along with
the actual ones. The two series are virtually not distinguishable.
114.2 Modelling heterogeneity in openness
As mentioned above, we assume that our sample of countries consists of one closed econ-
omy, the U.S., and n − 1 open economies. We parsimoniously model comovements in
open economies by adopting the GVAR approach proposed by Schuerman et al (2004):
ac o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc exogenous international variable, y∗
i,t, is constructed for each country







t yj,t i 6= j (10)
where the weights w
ij
t are based on trade shares – the share of country j in the total
trade of country i measured in U.S. dollars with wii
t =0 . The current value and the ﬁrst
lag of y 
i,t are included in the speciﬁcation of each country’s VAR to capture international
comovements in the cycle. We adopt the same procedure to model exchange rates. We
include, among the country-speciﬁc variables, the real exchange relative to the U.S. dollar,





wijsj,t i 6= j (11)
5R e s u l t s
The presentation of our results is organized in four subsections. We start by discussing
the robustness of ﬁscal multipliers estimated on panels of countries. We then explain why
it is important to keep track of debt dynamics and we show this with a case study of the
U.S. We close the section by showing our empirical results.
5.1 On the robustness of international ﬁscal multipliers
We start our empirical analysis by replicating the available international evidence on
the ﬁscal transmission mechanism (e.g. Alesina Ardagna 2010, IMF 2010), which, as we
said, is typically based on the panel estimation of a cross-country output equation. The
speciﬁcation, which is very similar to the one presented in equation (4), is a regression of
the growth rate of real GDP on a set of current and lagged values of ﬁscal shocks and
lagged GDP growth. In particular, IMF (2010) estimates, on their sample of ﬁfteen OECD
countries the following equation:
∆yi,t = α + A1(L,1)∆yi,t−1 + B(L,2)ε
g
i,t + C(L,2)ετ
i,t + λi + νt + μi,t (12)
The equation includes a full set of country dummies, λi, to account for diﬀerences in
trend growth rates across countries and time dummies, νt, to account for global shocks,
such as shifts in oil prices or the global business cycle.
12We replicate the results of the IMF study by reporting in Figure 4a-4b the multiplier
with respect to an aggregate ﬁscal shock, ε
g
i,t+ετ
i,t, obtained by imposing B(L,2) = C(L,2).
When aggregate shocks are considered, the estimated multiplier is statistically signiﬁcant
but smaller than 1.
[Insert Figure 4a-4b Here]
The simple empirical model described by (12) imposes very strong restrictions. The
eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations are assumed to be identical across countries: the only het-
erogeneity allowed for is that captured by the ﬁxed eﬀects in the panel estimation. We
doubt that this global ﬁscal multiplier is a useful concept for the selection of the structural
m o d e lt ob eu s e df o rp o l i c ya d v i c e .T h ef o l l o w ing assumptions, in particular, appear to be
very restrictive:
• ﬁscal shocks are assumed to be homogeneous across all countries. No heterogeneity
in the ﬁscal policy mix is allowed for;
• the responses of output to ﬁscal shocks are computed overlooking their eﬀects on
the dynamics of the debt. The speciﬁcation thus rules out the possibility that ﬁscal
dynamics diﬀer across countries characterized by diﬀerent debt levels. It also shuts
down another possibly important eﬀect, namely the eﬀect that ﬁscal shocks can exert
on interest rates;
• ﬁscal multipliers are assumed to be the same in small and open, and large and less
open economies. Moreover, the eﬀect of a global ﬁscal shock is assumed to be the
same as that of a local ﬁscal shock for each of the countries included in the sample.
5.2 On the importance of tracking debt dynamics
To illustrate the importance of keeping track of the debt dynamics we start by considering
a restricted version of our general empirical model. Equation (13) encompasses the single
equation speciﬁcation used in the IMF study. But it also allows to keep track of the
debt dynamics when computing impulse responses, thus checking whether multipliers are
computed along divergent ﬁscal paths. Otherwise it replicates the IMF study in that no
debt feedback is imposed. (Note that because we now keep track of debt dynamics the
sample is restricted to only eight countries, those for which the debt dynamics could be
reconstructed from the set of identities in (9))






i,t + μi,t (13)
with Xi,t =[ yi,t,g i,t,τi,t,τi,t,p i,t]. The usual set of identities in (9) is appended to (13)
in order to track debt dynamics endogenously. The model for Xi,t can be interpreted
as a set of stacked closed economy VARs: no exchange rate is included and no common
13ﬂuctuations among diﬀerent components of Xi,t across countries is allowed for. Moreover,
if panel restrictions are imposed, such that, for every country i, Ci,1 = C1, Ci,2 = C2,
γ
g
i = γg and γτ
i = γτ, (13) can be re-interpreted as an approximation of the truncated
MA representation of (12).
We have estimated the system (13) on data from our sample of eight countries. Figure
4b shows that the estimated multipliers replicate very closely those obtained with the IMF
speciﬁcation, equation (12) and reported in Figure 4a.
Figure 5 reports the simulated debt dynamics for each of the countries in the sample
and it clearly shows that for some of the countries the common multiplier is computed
along an unstable debt path.
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
We now come to the core of the paper. We shall estimate ﬁscal multipliers in a model
that allows for debt stabilization, international comovements and cross country hetero-
geneity. Before attacking this problem, however, we show a case study of the U.S. to
document the error one can make by omitting the debt-deﬁcit dynamics.
5.3 The eﬀects of overlooking the debt feedback: a case study of the
U.S.
This section illustrates the importance of keeping track of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on the
debt when estimating ﬁscal multipliers. We study what we have assumed to be a closed
economy, the U.S. We choose to do so because, as already mentioned, the analysis of ﬁscal
policy shocks on the U.S., modelled as a closed economy, has so far been the benchmark
in the literature. We start by estimating two models for the U.S. economy on the sample
1980-2009: a standard VAR model without debt feedback (13) and one with debt feedback.
(In this case the set of regressors in each of the VAR equations is augmented by the lagged
debt-to-gdp ratio and the debt dynamics is modeled by the identities in (9).
In practice, we consider the following system of equations for the US economy





us,t + μus,t (14)
where, as above, Xus,t ≡ [yus,t,g us,t,τus,t,i us,t,p us,t]. The vector of coeﬃcients ϕus describes
the feedback from the lagged debt-GDP ratio to the variables included in the system. As
in the previous Sections, the debt dynamics is endogenized by appending to the system in
(14) the identities described in (9).
To understand the importance of allowing for a debt feedback in estimating the ﬁscal
multiplier, we shall consider two alternative speciﬁc a t i o n so ft h i sm o d e l .F i r s t ,w ea n a l y z e
the ﬁscal VAR in (14) without feedback, that is, we impose the restriction ϕus =0 . Next,
we relax this assumption and re-estimate the same model allowing for ϕus 6=0 .W h e nw e






us}, that is we let the feedback aﬀect all variables
Xus,t except yus,t. We shall refer to this model as the ﬁscal VAR with debt feedback.
The two alternative speciﬁcations, with and without debt feedback, have strikingly
diﬀerent eﬀects on the dynamics of the endogenous variables following a ﬁscal shock–and
this plays an important role when computing ﬁscal multipliers. To illustrate this point,
we report in Figure 6 the simulated out-of sample dynamics of output growth, of the
debt—to-GDP ratio, the primary deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio, and the cost of ﬁnancing the debt,
as generated by the VAR without feedback (left column) and with a debt feedback (right
column). The simulated series are generated by taking, as initial conditions for all vari-
ables, their value in 2009 and then projecting each future path up to 2020 by solving the
model forward.
[Insert Figure 6 Here]
Figure 6 shows that the dynamics implied by the VAR model with no debt feedback is
unstable for all ﬁscal variables, although real GDP growth converges to a long-run value of
about four per cent. The same long-run steady state for growth is obtained by the model
with debt-feedback, but with a very diﬀerent path for the ﬁscal variables.
The out-of-sample simulation of the model without feedback produces a path for all
the endogenous variables that does not guarantee debt stabilization. Along this path: (i)
the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 1.75 in 2020, (ii) an unsustainable ﬁscal policy cumulates
yearly primary deﬁcits in the range of 10-20 percent of GDP, (iii) the rapid increase in
t h ed e b tr a t i oh a sn oe ﬀect on interest rates–in eﬀect, following the historical trend,
the cost of debt service falls to zero, (iv) despite the divergence of the debt ratio, real
growth converges rapidly toward its steady state value estimated at 2 percent. The results
from the model with a debt feedback are very diﬀerent. In the ﬁscal VAR with feedback
debt stabilization is achieved because the initial ﬁscal expansion, occurred in 2008-2009, is
eventually reversed, and the dynamics of the cost of ﬁnancing switches form an increasing
path to a converging one. The projected dynamics of the model with feedback reveals all
t h ef e a t u r e so fas u s t a i n a b l ed e b td y n a m i c s :(i) the debt-to-GDP ratio converges quickly
towards its steady state value, (ii) the primary deﬁcit after its peak at 10 per cent of
GDP in 2009 is progressively reduced and turns into a surplus by 2014-2020, (iii) interest
rates respond positively to the ﬁscal expansion, but also to the inversion in the path of
the deﬁcit, and eventually converge progressively toward a level between 2 and 3 per cent,
(iv) output growth converges to its steady state level of 2 per cent .
This evidence shows that impulses responses computed on the two models should be
interpreted very diﬀerently. In the case of the model without feedback the initial shock
lands the economy on an unsustainable ﬁscal path, while in the case of the model with
feedback this does not happen.
To further elaborate on this point, for each of the two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of model
15(14), we simulated the eﬀect of a ﬁscal shock corresponding to 1% of GDP, respecting the
historical policy style, i.e. the correlation between tax and spending shocks that charac-
terizes the US experience. In Figure 7 we show the responses of output and of the primary
deﬁcit.
[Insert Figure 7 Here]
The results are interesting. Consider ﬁrst the response of output to the ﬁscal adjustment
under the two models, with and without the debt feedback: there is no diﬀerence between
the two speciﬁcations. A clear diﬀerence, instead, emerges when we compare the eﬀect
of the ﬁscal adjustment on the primary deﬁcit. In the model without feedback, the ﬁscal
contraction has a permanent eﬀect on the primary deﬁcit. The deﬁcit falls and then remains
permanently negative. This explains what we observe in Figure 6 where the debt-to-GDP
ratio lands on a diverging path. Instead, in the model with feedback, the eﬀect of the
initial shock on the primary deﬁcit is eventually reversed, and the debt ratio converges
towards its long run mean.
T h el e s s o nf r o mF i g u r e7i st h a tﬁscal multipliers cannot be inferred by simply ana-
lyzing the impulse response of output to a ﬁscal shock because the same impulse response
can correspond to very diﬀerent ﬁscal multipliers. In our case, in the model without feed-
back, an initial ﬁscal retrenchment of 1% of GDP determines, after 5 years, a total ﬁscal
retrenchment of 11% of GDP. In the model with feedback the total ﬁscal retrenchment
generated by the same initial shock is instead 8% of GDP. The same total eﬀect an output-
namely a marginally signiﬁcant expansion of about 2% over a 5-year period- is therefore
obtained with a change in the deﬁcit/GDP ratio which diﬀers by 3 per cent between the
two simulated ﬁscal manoeuvres.
5.4 Computing the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy allowing for heterogeneity
We now come to the central point of our paper. We estimate ﬁscal multipliers in a model
that allows for debt stabilization, international comovements and cross country hetero-
geneity. We do this using the full model presented in (2) to compute the eﬀects of a ﬁscal
contraction of 1% of GDP obtained with a mix of tax increase and expenditure reduction
that reﬂects, country by country, the historical pattern of ﬁscal policy. The model allows
for diﬀerent policy styles across countries, diﬀerent debt-deﬁcit dynamics and diﬀerent
degrees of exposure to the international cycle. Table 1 illustrates the signiﬁcance of the
debt feedback by reporting the estimated coeﬃcients on the debt in the ﬁscal reaction
function of the diﬀerent countries. Note that debt stabilization plays a role in all coun-
tries: as the diﬀerence between the feedback coeﬃcients implies a positive feedback of the
primary surplus to the debt to GDP ratio, with the only exception of Japan. The style of
stabilization is however heterogenous across countries: lagged debt impacts more signiﬁ-
cantly (with a negative sign) on expenditures in Canada and the US while it has instead
16am o r es i g n i ﬁcant (positive) coeﬃcients on taxes in the cases of Italy, France and the UK.
[Insert Figure 8 and Table 1 Here]
The output multipliers for the eight countries, reported in Figure 8, document a very
high level of heterogeneity, suggesting that an aggregate homogeneous ﬁscal multiplier,
such as the one reported in Figure 4, would be diﬃcult to interpret. The output response
to a ﬁscal retrenchment ranges from signiﬁcantly contractionary in Belgium and France,
to not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the U.K., Sweden,and Italy, to initially zero and
then slightly espansionary in Canada, and the U.S., to signiﬁcantly expansionary in Japan.
Interestingly, the country that shows a signiﬁcant non-Keynesian eﬀect of a ﬁscal policy
retrenchment on output is Japan, which in our sample is the country that has shown the
most unstable debt dynamics with no mean reversion in the debt to GDP ratio.
6R o b u s t n e s s
In this section we check the robustness of our ﬁndings of heterogeneity in ﬁscal multipliers
to two modiﬁcations of the ﬁscal shocks included in our model. We ﬁrst analyze the impact
of local rather than international ﬁscal shocks, then we address explicitly the potential
endogeneity of narrative ﬁscal shocks.
6.1 Country-speciﬁcv e r s u sg l o b a ls h o c k s
So far the type of ﬁscal policy experiment considered is a simultaneous ﬁscal consolidation
across all countries in our sample. In fact, this is the type of shocks that is eﬀectively ana-
lyzed in the IMF studies when computing the ﬁscal multiplier based on the pooled output
growth equation and reported in Figure 4a. In the non-linear GVAR speciﬁcation there is
no need for imposing the restriction that ﬁscal policy is synchronized across all countries
as the extended speciﬁcation of the model allows for heterogeneity across countries and
for experimenting with local policy shocks. We have implemented such an experiment by
running eight diﬀerent simulations, one for each country in the sample, in which only one
country at time is subject to a ﬁscal shock while the others are inactive. We collected the
impulse responses in Figure 9
[Insert Figure 9 Here]
The results strengthen our general point on the importance of allowing for hetero-
geneity. Consider for example the case of the similarity of the output response to ﬁscal
policy in Canada and the USA that we reported in Figure 8 while analyzing the eﬀect
of a global ﬁscal shocks. Such similarity totally disappears in Figure 9 where we consider
the response to a local shock. In fact, the US response is virtually unaltered while the
17response in Canada is practically ﬂat at zero. This evidence shows that the exercise based
on a synchronized shock was basically measuring the response of the Canadian economy
to a US policy shocks rather than the ﬁscal multiplier in Canada. In other words, while in
the US a ﬁscal consolidation is expansionary (in the medium run), the same shift in ﬁscal
policy has no eﬀect on output in Canada. However when the US cuts spending and raise
taxes, output raises not only in the US but also in Canada. The same does not happen
symmetrically for the US when Canada consolidates, most likely because of the diﬀerent
size of the two economies. The identiﬁcation of the two separate eﬀects requires the higher
degree of heterogeneity of the non-linear GVAR model. In general, although all responses
to local shocks are smaller than those based on global shocks, Canada is the only case in
which there is a dramatic diﬀerence between these two experiments.
6.2 Are the Devries et al. (2011) narrative shocks exogenous?
Our second robustness check is based on a closer analysis of the exogeneity of the nar-
rative shocks. Our speciﬁcation strategy, based on the direct inclusion of the narrative
shocks in the non-linear VAR model, takes for granted the exogeneity of the tax hikes
and the expenditure cuts considered by Devries et al.(2011). Narrative shocks are based
on the exam of intentions and actions as described in policy documents to identify mea-
sures motivated primarily by deﬁcit reductions. Such ﬁscal actions represent a response to
past decisions and past economic conditions rather than to prospective conditions. As it
is clearly stated by Devries et al.(2011) "they are unlikely to be systematically correlated
with other developments aﬀecting output in the short-term and are thus valid for estimat-
ing the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal consolidations", however it is possible that these
narrative shocks capture the systematic response of ﬁscal policy to the debt dynamics
rather than its surprise components. The analysis of the impact of shocks to the policy
reaction functions implicitly estimated in a VAR is not based on changing any estimated
parameters and it is not therefore subject to the Lucas’ critique (see Lucas(1976) despite
the nature of a reduced form model of any VAR. This argument cannot be applied to the
narrative identiﬁed shocks inserted in a VAR if they are not orthogonal to the relevant
information set. In fact, if the orthogonality property is not satisﬁed a modiﬁcation in the
narrative shocks might eﬀectively involve a change in the parameters of the reduced form
model. To ﬁx ideas consider this simpliﬁed version of a ﬁscal reaction functions which
decomposes the dynamics of a generic ﬁscal policy variable into an automatic output sta-
bilization component, (β1yt), a discretionary output stabilization component, (β2yt−1) a
discretionary debt stabilization component, (β3dt−1), and a ﬁscal shock, u
fp
t :
fpt = β0 + β1yt + β2yt−1 + β3dt−1 + u
fp
t
The narrative approach is constructed to ﬁlter out of the ﬁscal variable the auto-
matic and discretionary output component but change in ﬁscal policy motivated by deﬁcit
reductions may reﬂect the true ﬁscal shock u
fp
t as well as the discretionary ﬁscal debt
18stabilization component. In other words the narrative approach might lead to identify
as ﬁscal shocks (fpt − β0 − β1yt − β2yt−1) rather than u
fp
t , generating a potential endo-
geneity bias in the GVAR speciﬁcation augmented with debt dynamics. To address this
potential problem, we have evaluated ﬁscal shocks against the information set of our GVAR
by ﬁrst regressing the narrative shocks on lags of output only and then by regressing them
on the full information set used in our non-linear GVAR. The results reported in Table
2 show that indeed the shocks are orthogonal to lags of output but that they are not
always orthogonal to the full information set included in the non-linear GVAR model. To
evaluate the consequences of this fact we have re-run our model by keeping the original
narrative shocks for the countries where they are orthogonal to the full information set,
and by substituting to the original narrative shocks the residuals of the regression of the
narrative shocks on the relevant information set for the countries where the orthogonality
hypothesis has been clearly rejected. The results, reported in Figure 10 that is directly
comparable with Figure 9 as we consider the output responses to local shocks , show that
the heterogeneity evidence is robust to the orthogonalization of the shocks, although for
some of the countries, the shape of the impulse responses is somewhat aﬀected (even if
the impact eﬀect is not).
[Insert Figure 10 and Table 2 Here]
7C o n c l u s i o n s
The main conclusion of our empirical analysis is that the question “what is the ﬁscal
policy multiplier” asked unconditionally is impossible to answer empirically and makes
little sense theoretically. There is no unconditional ﬁscal policy multiplier. The eﬀect of
ﬁscal policy on output is diﬀerent according to the diﬀerent debt dynamics, the diﬀerent
degree of openness and the diﬀerent ﬁscal reaction functions in diﬀerent countries. Pooling
together the evidence for diﬀerent countries to derive a single measure of the eﬀect of ﬁscal
retrenchments on output is therefore is of very little use to describe the eﬀect of exogenous
shifts in ﬁscal policy on output. In this paper we have derived empirical evidence on ﬁscal
multipliers by specifying a global non-linear VAR that allows for the three sources of
heterogeneity mentioned above. Moreover, our model generates ﬁscal multipliers computed
along paths that are not inconsistent with a positive value of government bonds. We ﬁnd
results that sharpen our understanding of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. In particular: (i)
international spillovers are important. In the case of Canada, for instance, it makes a big
diﬀerence whether a ﬁscal consolidations happens contemporaneously also in the U.S., or
only in Canada; (ii) the initial level of debt and the stability of the debt ratio seem to
determine whether a shift in ﬁscal policy has "keynesian" or "non-keynesian" eﬀects. In
our group of countries we ﬁnd evidence of non-keynesian eﬀects only in Japan. This is the
o n l yc o u n t r yi no u rs a m p l ew h e r eﬁscal policy does not respond to the level of debt and
where the debt level is non mean-reverting.
19The empirical results on the heterogeneity in the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy in our paper
should not be used to answer policy questions such as “How should a government respond
to a particular macro shock?”. These questions need to be addressed within the framework
of quantitative general equilibrium models of the business cycle - i.e. within the context of
a theoretical macro model rather than on an empirical reduced form econometric model.
Empirical results like those presented in this paper should be however considered in the
speciﬁcation of a DSGE model relevant for policy simulation analysis.
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Figure 5: Debt dynamics out-of-sample simulations (shaded area).
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Figure 6: USA, Simulated paths of macro variables with and without a debt feedback.
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Table 1: Coeﬃcients of bt−1 (t-Stats in parenthesis)
33Belgium Canada France Italy Japan Sweden UK USA
Exogeneity of spending shocks ε
g
i,t
Ii,t = {yi,t−1,y i,t−2}
F-Stat 4.41 0.15 0.14 1.71 0.24 0.12 4.17 0.04
F-Prob 0.021 0.85 0.86 0.19 0.78 0.88 0.025 0.95
Ii,t =
n






F-Stat 0.98 4.03 1.22 5.48 1.00 3.14 4.93 2.29
F-Prob 0.51 0.015 0.35 0.001 0.49 0.029 0.006 0.06
Exogeneity of tax shocks ετ
i,t
Ii,t = {yi,t−1,y i,t−2}
F-Stat 1.78 3.54 0.11 0.70 0.01 0.23 4.10 1.68
F-Prob 0.18 0.04 0.89 0.50 0.98 0.79 0.026 0.20
Ii,t =
n






F-Stat 2.77 10.4 1.94 1.30 0.67 3.40 4.34 1.17
F-Prob 0.03 0.0003 0.11 0.31 0.77 0.022 0.004 0.38
Table 1: Exogeneity test for IMF shocks
34